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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This tragic case arose from brain and skull injur-
ies appellant husband (Larry) sustained in a gyrocopter 
accident June 16, 1983. (R. 122) As a result, Larry suf-
fers long-term disabilities affecting cognitive, emotional 
and intellectual control. These disabilities interfere 
with his ability to handle money and finances and his abili-
ty to care for his children. (R. 136-138, Ex. 1-P) 
After reaching a plateau in his recovery, Larry 
repeatedly demonstrated poor financial judgment. In March 
1985, he spent Social Security benefit money on himself, 
rather than paying bills. (R. 198) Later that year, Larry 
went to California with rental money from a shop on the 
parties' sole piece of real property; the rental payments 
had been temporarily awarded to respondent wife (Marsha). 
Marsha was unable to make the mortgage payments on the 
parcel; to avoid foreclosure she was forced to refinance 
her car. Larry then refused to pay the real property taxes 
and used Social Security money necessary to pay the taxes 
for truck repairs. (R. 104-105, 199-202) Larry withdrew 
monies from the parties' joint bank account without Marsha's 
knowledge, resulting in overdrafts. (R. 203, 212) Larry's 
mother signed to withdraw money from the account without 
Marsha's knowledge. (R. 212) At the time of trial, Larry 
was living with his mother and she was handling his money 
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for him. (R. 239) 
The value of the parties1 sole parcel of real 
property, the chief marital asset, was not a disputed issue. 
Nor was the equity in the property or the total amount 
of marital debt. Counsel for each party stipulated that 
a realtor suggested the parties' real property be listed 
for $115,000. Larry's counsel commented, "Whether that 
is or isn't what it is worth is something we could ultimate-
ly determine with the passage of time. (R. 186-187) Larry 
was afforded the opportunity to put on evidence regarding 
the value of the real property; in his financial declaration 
he valued the property at $60,000.00, based upon an "educa-
ted guess." (R. 58) At the trial, Larry presented no 
testimony whatsoever regarding the value of the real proper-
ty, however. In fact, Larry did not testify at all; no 
guardian _ad_ litem was appointed for him. No witness testi-
fied in Larry's behalf. Several medical reports offered 
in evidence constituted Larry's case in chief. (R. 246-
248, Exs. 6-D, 7-D and 8-D) 
The evidence was uncontroverted that both Larry 
and his mother were abusive toward the parties' children. 
The parties' oldest daughter, Sharon, was traumatized by 
Larry's abuse of her and didn't complete high school. 
(R. 189) In October 1985, when living with his mother, 
Larry badly battered and bruised the parties' son, Ricky. 
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(R. 190-193) The children were aware Larry was sexually 
violent toward Marsha; Larry exposed himself in front of 
the children. (R. 194) The judge interviewed the children. 
Larry's mother demonstrated poor supervision 
of Ricky when he was visiting his father in the summer 
of 1986, allowing Ricky to witness sales of illegal drugs. 
(R. 228) In November 1985, Larry's mother told Ricky she 
had purposely killed Ricky's rabbits; then she stripped 
his new school clothes off him, dressed him in rags and 
sent him to Marsha with the police who had responded to 
a call of abuse. Several days later, Larry's mother told 
Ricky she had given his new school clothes to Deseret In-
dustries. (R. 229-231, 235-236) On yet another occasion, 
Larry's mother beat Ricky and kicked him out to wander 
around Murray with no money. (R. 232) 
Eighteen months after the accident, Larry's judg-
ment was unpredictable, exposing himself and others to 
physical danger by building a huge fire in a small wood 
stove. (R. 149-150) His rehabilitation physician, Dr. 
Clark, advised him, and the Drivers License Bureau as well, 
that he was not able to make sufficient judgments to drive 
safely. (R. 13-14) Nevertheless, Larry insisted upon 
driving. In May 1986, Larry's driving, with the children 
in the car, scared "the living daylights" out of Marsha. 
(R. 117-118, 225) 
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Efforts at vocational rehabilitation from January 
1984 through March 1985 failed. (R. 145-152, Ex. 2-P) 
Despite all the problems, however, Marsha was highly sup-
portive of efforts to treat and rehabilitate Larry. (R. 
126-127, 151, 175-176) Larry's mother was unable to accept 
his problems and limitations. (R. 127-129, 150-151, 152, 
238) He was under his mother's control. (R. 239) 
Larry was not the only disabled person in the 
family. Trial counsel stipulated to the admission of evi-
dence that Marsha suffers from a learning disability, 
(r. 177, Ex. 5-P) Ricky has severe behavioral problems 
(hyperactivity) that require therapy and a high degree 
of supervision. (R. 187) 
Marsha testified it would be her sole responsibil-
ity to raise the children. (R. 212-213) She testified 
it would be difficult to find housing comparable in expense 
to the mobile home she and the children lived in on the 
back of the parties' real property. (R. 92-93) 
Marsha grossed about $774 per month as a nurse's 
aide and received $242 in Social Security benefits for 
the two minor children. (R. 215, 205) She testified that 
her adult daughter, Sharon, who lived with her and worked 
as a housekeeper in a nursing home, contributed "very lit-
tle" to household expenses. (R. 217-218) Marsha's expenses 
were $1,454 per month. (R. 53) Despite Larry's financial 
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irresponsibility, she was current in her expenses at the 
time of trial. (R. 204) 
It does not appear in the record that Marsha 
stopped receiving the shop rental payment of $500 per month 
in 1987 when the real property was sold. Nor does it appear 
that her $121 Social Security benefit payment terminated 
upon divorce or that the net equity realized from the sale 
of the real property after payment of marital debts and 
Larry's medical bills, was about $16,000. 
Larry's Social Security income and expenses re-
mained at $708 per month. (R. 131) Larry presented no 
evidence of unmet financial needs. The $242 benefit for 
the children and the $121 for Marsha were not deducted 
from Larry's $708, but were in addition to it. (R. 204-
206) The Decree awarded only these benefits to Marsha 
as child support and "alimony." (R. L01-102) Larry's 
counsel stipulated in writing that Marsha should be awarded 
"at least the amount of the social Security disability 
payment for which she is eligible as defendant's wife or 
ex-wife." (R. 87) The trial court awarded her $1.00 per 
year alimony. (R. 10.) Larry's medical expenses are cov-
ered by Medicaid. (R. 207) There was no testimony that 
either Marsha or the children had any health insurance 
protection. 
Under these circumstances where Larry lacks the 
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ability responsibly to manage his own affairs and where 
the prospects for Marsha and the children are limited at 
best, the trial court's distribution of property was equi-
table and is entitled to a presumption of validity. The 
award of $1,00 per year alimony was certainly not an abuse 
of discretion. The Court's order regarding visitation 
was not unreasonable given Larry's inability to adequately 
protect the children from others1 abuse. The Decree of 
Divorce should be affirmed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant cannot complain to this Court about 
the trial court's distribution of marital property where 
1) the value of marital assets was not disputed at trial; 
2) he presented no evidence whatsoever regarding the valua-
tion of marital assets or debts; 3) he presented no evidence 
of unmet financial needs or the ability to identify or 
manage financial resources; and 4) his only evidence indi-
cated it might be good for him to putter around in the 
garage on the parties' real property. 
The trial court effectively awarded respondent 
$1.00 per year alimony "to preserve her right to alimony." 
Appellant stipulated that respondent "be awarded at least 
the amount of the Social Security disability payment for 
which she is eligible as defendant's wife or ex-wife." 
The trial court's order regarding support for respondent 
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was equitable. Appellant cannot be heard to argue other-
wise . 
Given the uncontroverted evidence of child abuse 
by appellant and his mother, the trial court's award of 
unsupervised reasonable visitation to appellant was more 
than equitable. The prospective restriction in the visita-
tion order reflects the trial court's intention that future 
abuse not occur in appellant's home. Residual parental 
rights and duties encompass more that the right to visita-
tion; restricting appellant's right to visitation would 
not constitute a deprivation of parental rights. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE 
IS EQUITABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IS ENTITLED TO 
A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY. 
In the distribution of the marital estate 
there is no fixed rule or formula. Within certain 
limits that have been set by the Supreme Court, 
the trial court may make such orders in relation 
to the parties as may be equitable. The trial 
court in a divorce action is permitted consider-
able discretion in adjusting the financial and 
property interests of the parties, and its actions 
are entitled to a presumption of validity. 
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986); 
Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986); Sinclair 
v. Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1986); and Olson 
v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985). 
This Court has recognized an exception to this 
general rule. In Peck v. Peck, 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 
filed July 2, 1987, the valuation of marital assets 
was was hotly disputed by the parties. Respondent/plain-
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tiff, not appellant /defendant, had prepared the findings. 
The findings failed to assign individual values to each 
of the assets or a total value to the cumulative share 
being awarded to each party. Absent property values in 
the findings, this Court was unable to determine whether 
the trial court distributed the property equitably. The 
matter was remanded to clarify which party?s valuation 
the trial court had adopted. 
A party may not avail himself of the Peck excep-
tion where valuations have not been included due to that 
party's omission. Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah 1987); 
and Jones, v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). In each 
of those cases the valuation of assets was also a hotly 
disputed issue. The findings had been prepared by the 
appellant/ defendant, however, and failed to assign values 
to the distributed assets. Because appellant/ defendant 
had failed to identify property values, this Court and 
the Utah Supreme Court, respectively, deemed the appellant/ 
defendant to have waived the right to challenge on appeal 
the distribution of property. 
The rule can be stated, then, that in order to 
challenge the distribution of property an appellant must 
show: 1) the value of assets was disputed a*t trial; 2) 
appellant presented evidence regarding the valuation of 
property; and 3) through no fault of appellant valuations 
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were not included in the findings. 
The Case at Bar 
In the case at bar, the valuation of marital 
property and debts was not disputed. Appellant totally 
failed to attempt to present any evidence of valuation 
of any marital property or debts. The only evidence appel-
lant presented was that it might be good for him to putter 
about in the garage on the real property. Appellant was 
given the opportunity to present evidence regarding the 
valuation of the real property. In response, counsel for 
appellant replied, "Whether ($115,000) is or isn't what 
it is worth is something we could ultimately determine 
with the passage of time." That respondent prepared the 
findings is immaterial where 1) the value of marital assets 
was never disputed; 2) appellant made no effort to present 
any evidence concerning valuation; and 3) appellant present-
ed no evidence that he wanted, needed, could manage or 
would even have access to any money he might be awarded 
from the sale of the real property. Through his failure 
to attempt to value the real property or indicate a finan-
cial justification for any distribution to him, appellant 
waived any claim to challenge on appeal the trial court's 
distribution of the marital estate. 
Appellant was unable to manage his own finances; 
his mother handled his money for him. He was living with 
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his mother; the testimony was that his mother controlled 
him. Indeed, it would have been an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to have awarded appellant any equity 
from the sale of the real property when it did not appear 
he might know he had it or would have any control over 
it. 
The trial court's distribution of marital property 
was equitable and is entitled to a presumption of validity. 
This is not a case where the valuation of property was 
disputed and the Peck exception does not apply. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY TO RESPONDENT 
WAS EQUITABLE. 
Appellant complains that the trial court abused 
its discretion in effectively awarding respondent $1.00 
per year alimony from him. Counsel for appellant stipulated 
that "plaintiff should be awarded at least the amount of 
the Social Security disability payment for which she is 
eligible as defendants wife or ex-wife. " The Court called 
this alimony in its award of support to respondent. Appel-
lant complains. 
The uncontroverted evidence was that the $121 
Social Security benefit respondent was to receive was not 
deducted from appellant's $708 Social Security permanent 
disability award, but was in addition to it. The $121 
award from the Social Security Administration derived from 
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the fact that respondent was the spouse of a permanently 
disabled person. The $121 award cost appellant nothing. 
If respondent were denied the right to receive it, appellant 
would not be entitled to receive any part of it. As a 
federal disability benefit effectively passed through to 
respondent, no ability to pay or need analysis was needed, 
especially where appellant stipulated that respondent should 
be entitled to the award. 
Appellantfs argument that the $1.00 per year 
alimony the trial court awarded respondent constitutes 
an abuse of discretion is spurious. His attempt to deprive 
respndent of the Social Security benefit he stipulated 
she should receive is vindictive. The Court should affirm 
the trial court's award to respondent of the right to re-
ceive the Social Security benefit and the $1.00 per year 
alimony. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION RESPECTING 
VISITATION WAS EQUITABLE. 
A trial court's determination respecting 
custody and visitation is equitable and will 
be overturned on review only for an abuse of 
discretion. Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah 
1985). 
The tragedy in this case is the extent to which appellant 
has been left cognitively, emotionally and intellectually 
unable to manage and control his own affairs. Before the 
accident he was an able father; his children love him. 
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Respondent expressed her desire that the children be able 
to spend time with their father, 
Unfortunately, there was considerable evidence 
of child abuse by appellant and by his mother. Appellant 
lives with his mother. Appellant objects to the trial 
court's visitation order because "it predicated husbandTs 
visitation on the conduct of a non-party over whom he has 
no control. Nowhere does the court indicate . . . that 
husband can control the conduct of his mother." 
Sadly, it is appellant's lack of control over 
his mother, with whom he lives, and his inability to protect 
his children from her conduct, which prompted the trial 
court to enter the visitation order it did. The trial 
court balanced the children's right to safety with husband's 
right to unsupervised, unrestricted reasonable visitation. 
The visitation order imposes only the minimal restriction 
that there be no abuse of the children when the children 
are visiting appellant. Clearly, the visitation order 
is in the best interest of the children under the circum-
stances of historical abuse. The visitation order is sur-
prising liberal given the abuse. 
Appellant equates his right to reasonable visita-
tion with all of those statutorily defined residual parental 
rights and duties he yet possesses after he stipulated 
that the trial court award respondent custody of the minor 
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children: 
1. Responsibility for support; 
2. Right to consent to adoption; 
3. Right to determine the child's religious 
affiliation; 
4. Right to reasonable visitation unless re-
stricted by the court; 
5. Right to consent to marriage; 
6. Right to consent to enlistment; 
7. Right to consent to major medical, surgical 
or psychiatric treatment. (U.C.A. §78-3a-2(10) 
The statute defines "termination of parental 
rights" to mean "the permanent elimination of all parental 
rights and duties, including residual parental rights and 
duties, by court order." (U.C.A. §78~3a-2(14) , emphasis 
added.) That simply is not the case here. The trial court's 
order not not purport to affect any residual parental right 
or duty other than the right to reasonable visitation. 
The legislature has given the trial court the right to 
restrict visitation. The trial court did not restrict 
appellant's visitation, unless and until there is abuse. 
Given the uncontroverted evidence of abuse and the fact 
that the trial judge interviewed the children, the restric-
tion is grounded in reason and compassion for appellant's 
rights as a non-custodial parent. The visitation order 
14 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent/appellant Marsha Diane Rush respect-
fully requests that this Court affirm the Decree of Divorce 
entered by the trial court in this matter on February 10, 
1987. Under the facts of this case, the award of the bal-
ance of the equity in the parties' real property to respon-
dent, after payment of marital debts and appellant's medical 
bills, was equitable and is entitled to a presumption of 
validity. This was not a case where the value of marital 
property was disputed. Appellant presented absolutely 
no testimony indicating an interest in or need for any 
proceeds from the sale of the parties1 real property; there 
was testimony indicating that if appellant were awarded 
any of the net proceeds, he would not be able to responsibly 
manage the money anyway. Appellant cannot challenge the 
distribution of the marital estate where he presented no 
evidence for the trial court to weigh. 
The award of alimony was based upon appellant's 
stipulation and he cannot be heard to complain that it 
was inequitable. 
Given the uncontroverted evidence of child abuse 
by appellant and by his mother, the visitation order is 
quite liberal. If appellant is not able to protect his 
children when they visit him, only his visitation rights 
15 
will be affected. His remaining parental rights and duties 
will not be affected. The trial court's visitation order 
should be affirmed. 
DATED: September 25, 1987 
LEE JfNNE WALKER 




Salt Lak« City. w 
DEC 1 8 1986 
LEE ANNE WALKER 
Attorney for plaintiff 
2520 S. State, Suite 172 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
(801) 486-8331 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARSHA DIANE RUSH, 
PLAINTIFF 
V 
LARRY GENE RUSH, 
DEFENDANT 
STIPULATION AS TO ISSUES 
SETTLED AND ISSUES RESERVED 
CIVIL NO. D85-2636 
JUDGE /U 
Upon the stipulation of the parties, based on the prior 
orders, the partial agreement reached at the pre-hearing before 
Commissioner Pueler, and the distribution of personal property 
pursuant to that agreement, the following matters have been 
settled: 
1. Plaintiff should be awarded the custody of the parties' 
— — — — — — — — — — __ . « —. , 
minor ch i ld ren , subject to reasonable v i s i t a t i o n by defendant, 
not to include v i s i t a t i o n ins ide the p l a i n t i f f ' s res idence , and 
not to invo lve p ick ing up or d e l i v e r i n g the c h i l d r e n before 8 
a.m. or a f t e r 8 p.m. I t i s c o n t e s t e d whether t h e r e should be 
other r e s t r i c t i o n s on v i s i t a t i o n , as no__o_ver night v i s i t a t i o n . 
2. That the i s s u e s of s u p p o r t , payment of deb t s and 
ob l iga t ions , and d i spos i t ion of the r ea l property are reserved 
for d i s p o s i t i o n by t h e C o u r t . The i s s u e of p l a i n t i f f ' s 
a t t o r n e y ' s fees and costs i s reserved. 
- — OCO( f 
3. That the Court should award the mobile home to ~ *" 
p l a i n t i f f , the 1981 Subaru to p l a i n t i f f , and the t ruck to the^ 
defendant, as in the pr ior orders . The pa r t i e s should assume the 
o b l i g a t i o n s of t he se r e s p e c t i v e i t ems as awarded and hold the 
other harmless therefrom. 
4. That defendant be r e s p o n s i b l e for and h^i, rf p l a ^ ^ , f f 
harmless from any deb t s ^r jnHgmpnhs frp incur red s ince the 
separat ion o f t h e pa r t i e s and for the repa i r b i l l incurred for 
h i s t r u c k . That the p a r t i e s be r e s p o n s i b l e for and hold each 
harmless from the i r own debts and obl iga t ions from the date of 
the divorce. 
5. That p l a i n t i f f be awarded a t l e a s t the amount of the 
Social Security d i s a b i l i t y payment for which she is e l i g i b l e as 
defendant's wife or ex-wife. I t i s contested whether she should 
be awarded alimony. 
6. I s s u e s r a i s e d in p r i o r proposed s t i p u l a t i o n s and not 
included in t h i s s t i pu l a t i on are to be considered contested. 
DATED this J^f day of Hj C ) U & ^ \ ^ ^ ^ - , 1986. 
^ a a<t OUSiim^ 
LEE ANNE WALKER 
Attorney for plaintifj 
EDWARD BRASS 
Attorney for defend 
C-GG ^ Q * 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
FEB 6 1987 
LEE ANNE WALKER 
Attorney for defendant 
2520 S. State, Suite 172 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
(801) 486-8331 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
CIVIL D85-2636 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on Wednesday, the 
19th day of November, at 10 a.m. and thereafter as required for 
the matter to be heard. The plaintiff was present and 
represented by her counsel, Lee Anne Walker. Defendant was 
present and represented by his counsel. 
Upon the testimony of the parties and their witnesses, 
exhibits received, the stipulations of the parties, the argument 
of counsel, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is granted a decree of divorce, to be final 
upon entry. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the custody of the parties' minor 
children, subject to reasonable rights of visitation at 
reasonable times and places bing vested in the defendant. 
In this regard, visitation will not take place at the residence 
or home of the plaintiff, and defendant shall give 48 hours 
1 
MARSHA DIANE RUSH, 
PLAINTIFF 
V 
LARRY GENE RUSH, 
DEFENDANT 
advance notice of when he wishes to visit with the children. The 
children shall not be required to go on visitations with the 
defendant if they reasonably do not desire to do so. The minor 
son of the parties may visit overnight with the defendant on 
those occasions when the defendant and the minor son so agree. 
The minor son is in no way obligated to visit overnight with the 
defendant, and may refuse to do so at any time. 
3. If there is any problem about abuse of the minor son by 
the defendant or his mother, or if the mother of the defendant in 
any way interferes with the visitation privilege, such privilege 
will be terminated. 
4. The defendant may drive a vehicle with the children in 
said vehicle only so long as the children are comfortable with 
him doing so. In the event they express any discomfort with his 
driving, he is to cease driving them immediately, and make other 
arrangements for transportation. 
5. The real property of the parties is ordered sold. The 
past due debts of both parties that were incurred prior to 
separation, including the medical bills of the defendant, shall 
be paid out of the proceeds of that sale. The balance of the 
equity in said property is awarded to the plaintiff for the 
purpose of her procuring housing for her and the minor children. 
6. Alimony is awarded the plaintiff in a sum equal to the 
monthly Social Security payment paid to her as the former spouse 
of a disabled person, plus $1.00 to preserve her right to 
alimony. 
7. Child support is awarded to plaintiff only in the amount 
of the support benefit payable to the minor children under Social 
Security. The defendant is ordered to assign such benefits 
above-described, and do all other things necessary to assure that 
the plaintiff and children receive the same. 
8. Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees and costs 
in this matter, 
9. The Court awards the mobile home to plaintiff, the 
1981 Subaru to plaintiff, and the truck to the defendant. The 
parties should assume the obligations of these respective items 
as awarded and hold the other harmless therefrom. 
10. The defendant is ordered to be responsible for and 
hold plaintiff harmless from any debts or judgments he incurred 
since the separation of the parties and for the repair bill 
incurred for his truck. The parties are ordered to be 
responsible for and hold each harmless from their own debts and 
obligations from the date of the divorce. 
11. The parties are both restrained from harrassing each 
other at all times. 
12. The personal property and furniture is awarded as 
divided. 
DATED this / 
/ 
day of ^uk jMAs^i,. , 198 
ATTEST 
H. DiXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
By ±L 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
EDWARD BRASS 
Attorney for defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of this 
Decree of Divorce to defendant's counsel, Edward K. Brass, at his 
office at 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 postage 
prepaid through the U. S. mails this 26th day of January, 1987. 
'Cy%^ <^w IQQJMM 
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Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-2 . 
U.C.A. 78-3a-2. Definitions. - As used in this act: 
(10) "Residual parental rights and duties" means 
those rights and duties remaining with the parent after 
legal custody or guardianship, or both, have been vested in 
another person or agency, including, but not limited to, the 
responsibility for support, the right to consent to adoption, 
the right to determine the child's religious affiliation, 
and the right to reasonable visitation unless restricted by 
the court. If no guardian has been appointed, "residual 
parental rights and duties" also include the right to consent 
to marriage, to enlistment, and to consent to major medical, 
surgical, or psychiatric treatment. 
(14) "Termination of parental rights" means the permanent 
elimination of all parental rights and duties, including 
residual parental rights and duties, by court order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies by her signature affixed 
hereto that on this 25th day of September, 1987, she per-
sonally hand delivered seven copies and the original of 
Respondent's Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals and four 
copies of the same upon Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney for Appel-
lant, Larry Gene Rush. /^j 
